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CATEGORIZING CONFLICT IN THE WARTIME
ENFORCEMENT OF FRAUDS ACT: WHEN ARE WE
REALLY AT WAR?
INTRODUCTION
In 2008, news headlines were inundated with a discourse born out
of one of the worst economic eras America has endured since the
Great Depression. Headlines thrived on catch phrases depicting the
financial turmoil running rampant from "Wall Street to Main Street,"1
and they made "Fannie and Freddie" household names.2 A new rhet-
oric had emerged to describe what had come to be labeled as the fore-
closure crisis.3 The economy was a pressing concern, and Congress
reacted, passing a $700 billion bailout plan to aid the country's finan-
cial sector. 4 Critics questioned the oversight mechanisms for the dis-
tribution of the bailout funds and with good cause. Due to ineffective
oversight before the bailout, the government had lost billions of dol-
lars as a result of contract fraud arising out of government spending
on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 5
Exacerbating the risk that bailout funds would be used fraudulently
was the fact that the ongoing "war on terror" was consuming govern-
ment resources that otherwise would have been used to investigate
and prosecute the misuse of government funds.6 Days after the
bailout passed, the New York Times reported that the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) was "struggling to find enough agents and re-
sources to investigate criminal wrongdoing tied to the country's eco-
nomic crisis."' 7 Following the September 11th attacks, the FBI
transferred nearly one-third of its agents to terrorism and intelligence
1. See, e.g., Peter S. Goodman, Slump Moves from Wall St. to Main St., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21,
2008, at A7; Donald Mengay, Letter to the Editor, Jitters from Wall Street to Main Street, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 17, 2008, at A26.
2. See, e.g., Peter Coy, Time to Let Fannie and Freddie Wither?, Bus. WK., July 11, 2008.
3. See, e.g., Bruce Marks, Bailout Must Address the Foreclosure Crisis, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept.
24, 2008, at A17.
4. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765, 3780
(2008).
5. See S. REP. No. 110-431, at 2 (2008).
6. See Eric Lichtblau, David Johnston & Ron Nixon, F.B.I. Struggling to Handle Wave of
Finance Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2008, at Al.
7. Id.
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programs, leaving the bureau "seriously exposed" when it came to in-
vestigating acts of fraud committed against the government.8
History seemed to be repeating itself, bringing with it, out of obscu-
rity, the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act (the Act or the Sus-
pension Act), 9 which was originally enacted during World War II
(WWII) when the FBI and Justice Department were facing deficien-
cies in investigative and prosecutorial resources that were similar to
the deficiencies faced in 2008.10 The Suspension Act tolls the statute
of limitations for acts of fraud1 committed against the government
"when the United States is at war," 12 providing the government with
more time than it would normally have to prosecute fraudulent actors.
Although the Act was regularly used for cases arising out of WWII, it
has remained dormant until recently. 13 Its recent use has raised a
number of significant questions: What does it mean to be at war?;14
Does a state of war exist only by formal declaration?; 5 Must there be
active combat?;16 Does the existence of a state of war depend on
8. Id.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (2006) (amended 2008).
10. See Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 218 (1953) (noting that Congress proposed the
Act because it "was concerned with the exceptional opportunities to defraud the United States"
that grew out of the nation's war contracts); H.R. REP. No. 77-2051, at 2 (1942).
11. The Act also tolls the limitations period for offenses involving "real or personal property
of the United States" and offenses "committed in connection with the negotiation ... [or] per-
formance ... [of] any contract ... which is connected with or related to the prosecution of the
war." 18 U.S.C. § 3287(2)-(3).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 3287. The fraudulent act need not be related to the war in any way. See
United States v. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d 436, 442 (D. Mass. 2008) (illustrating that the "absence
of a connection between the fraud and wartime procurement" is irrelevant).
13. "18 U.S.C. § 3287 appears to have only been used in cases that involved conduct during or
shortly after WWII. There are no civilian cases that involve the use or application of [the Act]
since that era." United States v. Shelton, 816 F. Supp. 1132, 1134-35 (W.D. Tex. 1993).
14. See Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 442; Shelton, 816 F. Supp. at 1135.
15. See Clyde Eagleton, The Form and Function of the Declaration of War, 32 AM. J. INT'L L.
19, 21 (1938) ("It is not intended thereby to say that war can exist only after a declaration ....").
But see J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27, 34 (1992) (noting that some scholars
advocate that Congress should use a formal declaration to declare war).
16. One author criticizes "the conflation of war and combat." BRIEN HALLET, THE LOST ART
OF DECLARING WAR 23 (1998). But see MARTIN VAN CREVELD, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
WAR 161 (1991) ("The essence of war is fighting."). Hallet lays out the difficulty in determining
whether a conflict is a "war":
[H]ow is one to sort out the relationships among formally declared war, war in general,
and informally declared armed conflict? Is war the genus, which contains at least two
species, (formally declared) war and (formally undeclared) armed conflict? Or is
armed conflict the genus, which contains at least two species, (formally declared) war
and (formally undeclared) war? Or is conflict the genus, which contains at least two
species, unarmed conflict and armed conflict, which in turn subdivides into (formally
declared) war and (formally undeclared) armed conflict?
HALLET, supra, at 94-95.
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whether a certain amount of resources have been devoted to the con-
flict? Answering these questions is complicated by the fact that war is
a dynamic phenomenon. The manner in which countries wage war
evolves as technology and international relations evolve.
17
When applying wartime statutes like the Suspension Act, courts
must resolve these questions by engaging in what this Comment will
refer to as the "wartime determination." The wartime determination
requires courts to discern when a war begins and when it ends. It is
unique for each wartime statute because what constitutes war for the
purposes of one statute may not constitute war for the purposes of
another.18 This Comment will explore what it means for the United
States to be at war for the purposes of the Suspension Act. Only two
courts have engaged in this wartime determination,' 9 and their deci-
sions are not in accord. One court decided that Congress must for-
mally declare war for the United States to be at war as contemplated
by the Suspension Act.20 The other determined that a formal declara-
tion of war was not necessary for the Act to apply.21 In 2008, Con-
gress enacted the Wartime Enforcement of Frauds Act (WEFA)22 to
clarify the Suspension Act's wartime determination and to ensure that
the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan would invoke the Act's tolling
provision. 23
This Comment examines the Suspension Act's wartime determina-
tion and how it has been affected by WEFA, arguing that the Suspen-
sion Act, as evidenced by its legislative purpose, was intended to apply
to conflicts beyond formally declared wars. This Comment also as-
serts that the changes that WEFA imposed upon the Act, though done
with laudable purpose, were unnecessary and may have a detrimental
impact upon the Act's future application. Part II of this Comment
discusses the legislative and judicial background of the Act. 24 Part III
17. "How one defines a time of war has crucial importance as [we] encounter[] new variations
on the classic model of a formally declared war," "including the amorphous War on Terror."
John M. Hagan, Note, From the XYZ Affair to the War on Terror: The Justiciability of Time of
War, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1327, 1332 (2004).
18. See Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228, 231 (1958) ("Congress in drafting laws may decide that
the Nation may be 'at war' for one purpose, and 'at peace' for another.").
19. "The 'at war' clause of the Suspension Act has not been the subject of extensive judicial
review-in fact only one district court has been called upon recently to decide its meaning."
United States v. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d 436, 444 (D. Mass. 2008).
20. See United States v. Shelton, 816 F. Supp. 1132, 1135 (W.D. Tex. 1993).
21. See Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 436.
22. See Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-
417, § 855, 122 Stat. 4356, 4545 (2008).
23. See S. REP. No. 110-431, at 4 (2008).
24. See infra notes 28-103 and accompanying text.
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examines WEFA and its legislative history, focusing on how WEFA's
proponents intended to amend the Suspension Act.25 Part IV argues
that WEFA made an unnecessary change to the Suspension Act,
which potentially inhibits the Act's purpose. 26 Finally, Part V dis-
cusses the potential impact that WEFA may have on judicial construc-
tion and application of the Suspension Act.27
II. BACKGROUND
This Part examines the development of the wartime determination
in the Suspension Act, focusing on the Act's legislative purpose as a
means of guiding how and when the Act should apply. Section A ex-
plores the Act's legislative history in order to glean the legislative pur-
pose behind the tolling provision.28 Section B focuses on cases that
have interpreted the Act and its legislative purpose.29
A. The Legislative History of the Suspension Act
The Suspension Act has undergone numerous revisions since its
original enactment during WWII.3° When enacting the Suspension
Act, Congress drew from the reasoning behind a law enacted during
World War I (WWI). Therefore, in order to fully understand the rea-
soning behind the Suspension Act, it is helpful to analyze the reason-
ing behind its WWI counterpart.
1. WWI and the Precursor to the Act
The WWI law that the Suspension Act emulated extended the stat-
ute of limitations period for acts of fraud committed against the gov-
ernment from three years to six years.31 Nearly three years after
WWI ended, the government realized that it would need more than
the three years provided by the traditional statute of limitations in
order to successfully combat the growing issue of contract fraud that
had developed out of WWI's procurement program. 32 The extension
was granted at the behest of the Attorney General who wrote to Con-
gress that "there [were] many cases growing out of the war upon
25. See infra notes 104-141 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 142-278 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 279-285 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 30-56 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 57-103 and accompanying text.
30. Act of Aug. 24, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-706, ch. 555, 56 Stat. 747 (1942).
31. Act of Nov. 17, 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-92, ch. 124, 42 Stat. 220 (1921).
32. See 61 CONG. REC. 7060 (1921) (statement of Rep. Graham).
[Vol. 59:979
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which that statute of limitations [would] soon run, placing the govern-
ment to a disadvantage unless [Congress granted] some relief."33
Congress noted that in addition to being a more prevalent crime as
a result of the war, contract fraud is one of the more difficult crimes
that the Justice Department prosecutes due to the difficulty inherent
in discovering and investigating it.34 Allegations of fraud require "the
most minute investigation in order to ascertain the exact facts" and a
"considerable period" of time to ascertain whether those facts justify a
prosecution. 35
Although it was enacted into law, the extension was only tempora-
rily in effect. Three years after its enactment, Congress re-imple-
mented the three-year limitations period36 because the circumstances
necessitating the extension no longer existed.37
2. The Act During WWII: Enacted, Amended, Amended and
Enacted Again
Although the extension was repealed, the reasoning behind it re-
mained persuasive and was employed by both House and Senate Judi-
ciary Committees during WWII.38 Aware of the constraints that the
Justice Department faced following WWI,3 9 Congress enacted the first
version of the Suspension Act (the Temporary Suspension Act), 40 sus-
pending the "running of any existing statute of limitations applicable
to offenses involving" fraud against the United States until June 30,
1945.41
The House and Senate committee reports echoed the reasoning that
supported the enactment of the WWI extension, noting that while the
normal three-year limitations period was sufficient during "normal
times," the realities of wartime necessitated the suspension.42 Like
33. Letter from H.M. Daugherty, Att'y Gen. of the United States, to A.J. Volstead, Cong.
Representative (Aug. 13, 1921), in 61 CoNo. REc. 7062 (1921).
34. See H.R. REP. No. 67-365, at 1 (1921).
35. Id.
36. Act of Dec. 27, 1927, Pub. L. No. 70-3, ch. 6, 45 Stat. 51 (1927).
37. "[T]he Department of Justice announced.., that it did not propose to attempt any further
prosecution of ... offenses giving rise" to the extension. H.R. REP. No. 70-16, at 1 (1927).
38. See H.R. REP. No. 77-2051, at 1-2 (1942); S. REP. No. 77-1544, at 2 (1942) (citing H.R.
REP. No. 67-365 (1921)).
39. See H.R. REP. No. 77-2051, at 1 (1942).
40. Act of Aug. 24, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-706, ch. 555, 56 Stat. 747 (1942).
41. Id. It is interesting to note that the bill, as passed by the House, suspended the statute of
limitations for "the period of the present war and for 6 months thereafter." 88 CONo. REC. 4759
(1942). This wording is more in line with the statute as it reads today. However, the Senate
amended the bill, omitting the above portion and replacing it with a specific date-June 30, 1945.
See S. REP. No. 77-1544, at 1 (1942).
42. H.R. REP. No. 77-2051, at 2 (1942); S. REP. No. 77-1544, at 2 (1942).
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the proponents of its WWI counterpart, proponents of the Temporary
Suspension Act argued that the suspension was necessary because the
government was spending "huge sums of money" on contracts that
were necessary to run a "gigantic war program. ' 43 These expendi-
tures created greater opportunity for the government to fall victim to
fraudulent activity. 44
Congress again recognized fraud as a difficult crime to investigate
because it is difficult to discover."5 Proponents of the Temporary Sus-
pension Act noted that war strains governmental law enforcement
agencies' resources, making the inherently difficult investigation into
fraud even more difficult.46 During wartime, the Justice Department
must enforce laws that are not in effect during peace time, including
laws that are applicable only in wartime and new laws that are created
as a result of the specific war itself.47 Under these additional laws, the
Justice Department's case load increased.48 During WWII, new units
had to be created within the Justice Department to keep up with the
demands of the war. Notably, a War Frauds Unit was created to en-
sure "the vigorous and prompt prosecution of cases involving frauds
under government contracts. ' 49 In light of these increasing demands
on the Justice Department, proponents urged for the passage of the
suspension in order to "ensure that the limitations statute [would] not
operate under the stress of present-day events" to the advantage of
fraudulent actors. 50
In 1944, the Temporary Suspension Act was amended.5 1 The
amendment changed the sunset provision in the Act.52 Rather than
end on June 25, 1945, the amendment provided that the suspension
would continue until "three years after the termination of hostilities in
43. H.R. REP. No. 77-2051, at 2; S. REP. No. 77-1544, at 2; see also Bridges v. United States,
346 U.S. 209, 218 (1953) (noting congressional concern over the potential to defraud the govern-
ment that was "inherent in [the government's] gigantic and hastily organized procurement
program").
44. See H.R. REP. No. 77-2051, at 2.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See 88 CONG. REC. 4759 (1942) (statement by Rep. Rankin).
48. Consider, for example, Justice Department investigations and prosecutions of espionage.
"In the 5-year period preceding 1938, the [FBI] investigated an average of 35 espionage matters
each year." 1941 ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 178. In 1942, "more than 100,000 matters.., involving
selective service, espionage, sabotage, sedition, treason, foreign agents, [and] trading with the
enemy" commanded the Department's attention. 1942 AT'-r GEN. ANN. REP. 6.
49. 1942 Aarr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 10-11.
50. H.R. REP. No. 77-2051, at 2 (1942); S. REP. No. 77-1544, at 2 (1942).
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the present war as proclaimed by the President or by a concurrent
resolution of the two Houses of Congress. '5 3
In 1948, Congress once again amended the Temporary Suspension
Act and reenacted it as the Suspension Act, making it permanent. 54
As enacted in 1948, the Suspension Act reads in pertinent part,
When the United States is at war the running of any statutes of limi-
tations applicable to any offense involving fraud or attempted fraud
against the United States or any agency thereof in any manner
whether by conspiracy or not.... shall be suspended until three years
after the termination of hostilities as proclaimed by the President or
by a concurrent resolution of Congress.55
This was the form that the Suspension Act maintained until the pas-
sage of WEFA in 2008.
B. Judicial Interpretation of the Act
The judicial history regarding the Act's wartime determination has
not been as extensive as the Act's legislative history. As noted above,
only two courts have engaged in the wartime determination. As dis-
cussed below, however, several military cases required interpretation
of the Act's military counterpart, which mandates as a preliminary
matter that the courts make the wartime determination for the Act.
1. The Absence of a Wartime Determination in WWII Cases
The cases arising out of WWII, in which the government relied
upon the tolling provision of the Suspension Act, did not establish
precedent for the Act's wartime determination.5 6 These cases did not
resolve the issue of whether and when a war had begun because this
determination was simply unnecessary. The 1942 version of the Act
expressly stated that the suspension would be in "effect from and after
the date of [the Act's] passage. ' 57 Thus, for cases arising out of
53. Id. (emphasis added).
54. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-772, § 3287, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 683, 828 (1948).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (2006) (emphasis added).
56. Most cases involved determining which crimes constituted the substantive offenses enu-
merated in the Act to which the tolling provision applied. See, e.g., Bridges v. United States, 346
U.S. 209, 221 (1953) (determining that the Act did not apply to offenses that did not involve
defrauding the nation in any "pecuniary manner or in a manner concerning property"). The
cases of this era were also concerned with whether the limitations period was tolled for crimes
that occurred in the three-year period after the termination of hostilities. See, e.g., United States
v. Smith, 342 U.S. 225, 228 (1951) (holding that the Suspension Act is inapplicable to crimes
committed after the date on which hostilities had terminated).
57. Act of Aug. 24, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-706, ch. 555, 56 Stat. 747, 747-48 (1942).
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WWII, the tolling provision became effective upon its enactment, Au-
gust 24, 1942.58
Determining when the tolling period ended, and consequently the
date from which the three-year "grace" period was to be measured,
similarly presented no material issue in these cases. The 1942 version
of the Act provided an exact date upon which the Suspension Act
would no longer be in force.59 The 1944 and 1948 versions determined
that the date upon which the Act would cease to toll the statute of
limitations would be the date of "termination of hostilities ... as pro-
claimed by the President or by a concurrent resolution of the two
Houses of Congress. '60 On December 31, 1946, President Harry Tru-
man announced the cessation of hostilities of WWII through a formal
presidential proclamation.61 Because this formal proclamation clearly
satisfied the requirement of the Act,62 courts accepted it as the date
on which the three-year grace period commenced. 63
2. Looking to the Military Courts for Some Wartime Guidance
The Act was not litigated in civilian courts during the period follow-
ing WWII until the Persian Gulf Conflict.64 The Act received more
interpretation during this period from military courts that interpreted
the Act's military counterpart. 65 Article 43(f)(1) of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice (Article 43)66 was taken directly from the Suspen-
58. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 342 U.S. 225, 231 (1952) (Clark, J., concurring); United
States v. Covollo, 136 F. Supp. 107, 110 (E.D. Penn. 1955); United States v. Strange Bros. Hide
Co., 123 F. Supp. 177, 181 (N.D. Iowa 1954). These cases noted that the suspension applied to
offenses committed on or after August 25, 1939-two years and 364 days before the Temporary
Suspension Act was enacted. On August 24, 1942-the date the Temporary Suspension Act
came into effect-these offenses were not yet barred by the three-year statute of limitations,
meaning that the remainder of the limitations period (one day) was still suspended.
59. Act of Aug. 24, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-706, ch. 555, 56 Stat. 747-48 (1942).
60. Id.
61. See Proclamation No. 2714, 12 Fed. Reg. 1 (Jan. 1, 1947).
62. The text of the Act notes that the suspension "shall be in effect until three years after the
termination of hostilities as proclaimed by the President." 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (2006). Although
the text of the 1944 Act did not require that the proclamation be formal, President Truman's
proclamation was a formal presidential proclamation entitled "Cessation of Hostilities of
WWII." Proclamation No. 2714, 12 Fed. Reg. at 1.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 342 U.S. 225, 227 (1952); United States v. Covollo, 136 F.
Supp. 107, 109 (E.D. Penn. 1955); United States v. Choy Kum, 91 F. Supp 769, 770 (N.D. Cal.
1950).
64. See United States v. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d 436, 444 (D. Mass. 2008); United States v.
Shelton, 816 F. Supp. 1132, 1135 (W.D. Tex. 1993).
65. See United States v. Swain, 10 C.M.A. 37 (1958); United States v. Taylor, 4 C.M.A. 232
(1954); United States v. Ayers, 4 C.M.A 220 (1954) (Quinn, C.J., dissenting).
66. Article 43(f) stated that "[w]hen the United States is at war, the running of any statute of
limitations applicable to any offense under this chapter involving fraud ... against the United
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sion Act, and as a result, the Military Court of Appeals stated that
Article 43 was to be construed in the same manner that the United
States Supreme Court interpreted (or would interpret) the Suspension
Act.67 The military courts were the first to determine whether "police
actions" or "military conflicts" constitute war for the purposes of the
Act.68
The courts generally took a totality of the circumstances approach,
looking to whether the conditions created by the conflict led to the
conclusion that the nation was "in a state of war within the meaning of
the term as used by Congress" for the purposes of Article 43.69 In
United States v. Swain, the court held that the Korean conflict, though
officially deemed a "police action," was a war for purposes of Article
43.70 In making this determination, the court looked to several fac-
tors, including,
the casualties involved; the sacrifices required; the drafting of re-
cruits to maintain the large number of persons in the military ser-
vice; the national emergency legislation enacted ... ; the executive
orders promulgated; and the tremendous sums being expended for
the express purpose of keeping the [armed forces] in . .
operation[ ].71
The Military Court of Appeals also interpreted Article 43 to deter-
mine what constitutes a proclamation of the "termination of hostili-
ties."' 72 In United States v. Taylor, the court noted that Article 43 was
enacted to provide the government additional time within which to
discover and prosecute "frauds" by deferring the running of the stat-
ute of limitations for three years following a "formal proclamation of
termination of hostilities."73 Thus, the court read the Act to require
that the presidential proclamation of the termination of hostilities be a
formal proclamation.
States ... is suspended until three years after the termination of hostilities as proclaimed by the
President or by a joint resolution of Congress." Swain, 10 C.M.A. at 38.
67. See id. at 40.
68. See id. at 39.
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. Id. at 39. This determination was not without opposition. See United States v. Ayers, 4
C.M.A. 220, 231 (1954) (Quinn, C.J., dissenting) (discussing a U.S. Supreme Court case arising
out of the Korean War-in which the statute of limitations had run and the government had
failed to argue that the Act applied-as indicative of the fact the Act was not intended to apply
to the Korean War).
72. United States v. Taylor, 4 C.M.A. 232 (1954).
73. Id. at 236 (emphasis added).
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3. The Comeback Kid: The Act Reappears in the Civilian Courts
The first civilian case dealing with the Act's wartime determination,
United States v. Shelton, was decided by a Texas district court in
1993. 74 In Shelton, the defendant was indicted for conspiring to com-
mit bribery and for misapplying federal funds.75 The government is-
sued the indictment more than five years after the alleged conduct
took place, despite a five-year statute of limitations.7 6 The govern-
ment argued that the claim was preserved pursuant to the Suspension
Act, which suspended the statute of limitations for the duration of,
and three years following, the termination of the Persian Gulf con-
flict.77 The court disagreed and stated that "[f]or the Persian Gulf
conflict to have amounted to a war under [the Suspension Act], Con-
gress should have formally recognized that conflict as a war."'78
The Shelton court stated that the legislative purpose of the Act was
to assist governmental law enforcement during conflicts as "massive
and pervasive" as WWI. It concluded that because the government
did not rely upon the Suspension Act during any of the conflicts after
WWII, those conflicts-the Korean and Vietnam wars-must not
have been "massive" enough to invoke the tolling provision.79 Based
upon this reasoning, the court held that an even "less intrusive con-
flict," such as the Persian Gulf War, was insufficient to invoke the
Act.80 According to Shelton, in order for a conflict to constitute a war
for purposes of the Suspension Act, Congress must formally declare it
a war. Any conflict that did not obtain this designation did not qualify
for the tolling of the limitations period.
In United States v. Prosperi,81 the wartime determination for the
Suspension Act arose in the context of the Iraq and Afghanistan con-
flicts.812 Under the Shelton approach, neither the Iraq nor the Afghan
conflict would constitute war for the purpose of the Suspension Act
because neither was initiated by formal congressional declaration. 83
74. United States v. Shelton, 816 F. Supp. 1132 (W.D. Tex. 1993).
75. See id. at 1134.
76. See id. During WWII, the limitations period for fraud was three years. 18 U.S.C. § 3282
(1948). That period was permanently extended to five years in 1954. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2006).
77. See Shelton, 186 F. Supp. at 1134.
78. Id. at 1135. The court dismissed the wartime determinations of military courts in constru-
ing Article 43 as unpersuasive because the standard that an armed conflict must meet to consti-
tute a war for the military purposes is different-that is, lower-than the standard that an armed
conflict must meet in order to constitute a war for civilian purposes. See id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 573 F. Supp. 2d 436 (D. Mass. 2008).
82. See id. at 439-40.
83. Both conflicts were authorized pursuant to the War Powers Resolution. See id. at 450.
[Vol. 59:979
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The Prosperi court rejected the Shelton court's approach, reasoning
that the Shelton court read a condition precedent into the wartime
determination that the Suspension Act did not require.8 4 The Pros-
peri court noted the absence of any provision in the text of the Act or
its legislative history that indicated that the Act required a formal con-
gressional declaration of war before its provisions could be invoked. 85
According to the Prosperi court, the text and legislative history of the
Suspension Act indicated that it was "intended to capture any author-
ized military engagement that might compromise or impede the gov-
ernment's ability to investigate allegations of fraud. '86 Rather than
taking an approach entirely dependent on nomenclature, the Prosperi
court followed the military court's interpretation 87 and took a multi-
factor approach.88
The Prosperi court announced a four-factor test for determining if
the country is at war for purpose of the Suspension Act. The factors
include the following:
(1) the extent of the authorization by Congress to the President to
act; (2) whether the conflict is deemed a "war" under accepted defi-
nitions of the term and the rules of international law; (3) the size
and scope of the conflict (including the cost of the related procure-
ment effort); and (4) the diversion of resources that might have
been expended on investigating frauds against the government. 89
After applying the four factors, the court determined that both the
Iraq and Afghan conflicts constituted wars for the purposes of the
Suspension Act. 90
In addition to addressing whether the United States was "at war"
for the purposes of the Suspension Act, the Prosperi court also inter-
preted the "termination of hostilities" clause. 91 Although civil courts
had previously always looked to a formal presidential proclamation
when determining whether hostilities had ended,92 the court in Pros-
peri relied on the plain language of the Act to determine whether the
84. See id. at 445.
85. Id. at 449.
86. Id.
87. See United States v. Taylor, 4 C.M.A. 232 (1954).
88. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 449. This approach, though with different factors, has been
used by courts historically in various wartime determinations. See Hagan, supra note 17, at 1360.
89. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 449.
90. See id. at 455.
91. See id. at 454-55.
92. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
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termination of hostilities had in any way been proclaimed by the presi-
dent or recognized in a congressional resolution. 9
3
The Prosperi court determined that the termination of hostilities in
Iraq was proclaimed on May 1, 2003,94 when President George W.
Bush-while aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln-stated that "[m]ajor
combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the battle of Iraq, the
United States and our allies have prevailed. '95 This speech was not a
formal presidential proclamation like that given, by President Truman
after WWII. Nonetheless, the court believed that it satisfied the Act's
criteria. It reasoned that formal actions recognizing the termination
of hostilities were the "modern exceptions," and that the end of more
recent conflicts had been signaled by presidential pronouncement.
96
Similarly, the court determined that the United States' formal recog-
nition of an extension of diplomatic relations to the new government
of Afghanistan on December 22, 2001 was a congressional act that
signified the termination of hostilities for the Afghanistan conflict.
97
This examination of the Act's legislative and judicial history reveals
two important aspects of the Act. First, regardless of the Act's chang-
ing form, the purpose behind it has remained constant: providing the
government with additional time during periods of war in order to
investigate allegations of fraud, when, as a consequence of war, the
potential for fraud increases while government resources are
stretched. 98 Second, two divergent views regarding the Act's wartime
determination have emerged. The phrase "at war," as used in the stat-
ute, has been interpreted to signify a formally declared war,99 but it
has also (and more often) been interpreted to signify any conflict
whose circumstances amount to a war for the purpose of the Act. 100
Similarly, the way in which courts have interpreted the sunset provi-
sion of the Act has also resulted in divergent views. One court deter-
mined that the termination of hostilities must be declared through a
formal presidential proclamation. 10 1 The Prosperi court, alternatively,
determined that a presidential speech was an adequate indication of
93. See Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 455. When the court decided Prosperi, neither a formal
presidential proclamation nor any concurrent resolution of Congress had been made declaring
that hostilities in either conflict had ended. See id.
94. Id. at 455.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 454.
97. See id. at 455.
98. H.R. REP. No. 77-2051, at 2 (1942).
99. See United States v. Shelton, 816 F. Supp. 1132 (W.D. Tex. 1993).
100. See Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 436; United States v. Taylor, 4 C.M.A. 232. 237 (1954).
101. See Taylor, 4 C.M.A. at 236.
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when hostilities had ceased.10 2 It is on the backdrop of these diver-
gent but thinly developed interpretations of the Act that the 110th
Congress proposed WEFA in an effort to provide some clarity.
III. THE CONGRESSIONAL CLAIM: WE NEED WEFA
America's involvement in the conflicts in both Iraq and Afghani-
stan, coupled with the extensive use of private contractors' 0 3 in vari-
ous aspects of the war effort, gave rise to the potential for and
realization of an unprecedented amount of contract procurement
fraud committed against the U.S. government. 10 4 By 2008, contract
fraud had generated a loss in the billions, but only a few cases-in-
volving less than $30 million-had been initiated by the govern-
ment. 0 5 This prompted Congress to reexamine the Suspension Act.
WEFA 10 6 was proposed in order to make two 1( 7 significant changes
to the Act's wartime determination.108 First, WEFA was proposed to
clarify and expand the term "war" as it was used in the Act. 109 Sec-
ond, WEFA made clear that that the action signaling the termination
of hostilities for the purposes of the Suspension Act must be a formal
presidential proclamation with notice to Congress or a concurrent res-
olution of Congress. 110
The concerns that gave rise to WEFA echoed those of the original
Suspension Act. WEFA's Committee Report noted the increased
possibility for fraud arising out of the many contractual relationships
that the government entered into in order to wage war in Iraq and
Afghanistan."' It also noted the excessive strains imposed by the
102. See Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 455.
103. The committee report accompanying the Wartime Enforcement of Frauds Act (WEFA)
noted that "[pirivate contractors have been used to a greater extent during these war-time activi-
ties than at any time in our history." S. REP. No. 110-431, at 3.
104. See id. at 2.
105. Id.
106. S. 2892, 110th Cong. (2008).
107. Three changes were made to the text of the Act, but for the purposes of this Comment
only two changes will be discussed. It is worth noting, however, that in addition to the changes
that affect the wartime determination, WEFA also extended the number of years for which the
tolling period would remain in effect after the termination of hostilities from three years to five
years. S. 2982, 110th Cong. (2008). This measure brought the Act in accord with the "standard
statute of limitations for all criminal fraud provisions," which, as previously noted, had been
extended from three years to five years. S. REP. No. 110-431, at 5 (2008).
108. See S. REP. No. 110-431, at 9.
109. See id. at 4.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 3.
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wars upon governmental investigative bodies, 112 pointing to the re-
quests from those bodies seeking assistance in their efforts to prose-
cute fraudulent activity. 113
WEFA's purpose was clear from the outset: to clarify, redefine, and
modernize the Suspension Act's wartime determination. 1 4 WEFA af-
fected both the determination of whether and when wars have be-
gun 1 5 and the determination of whether and when hostilities have
terminated.11 6
A. The Effort to Expand What It Means to Be "At War"
To better understand how WEFA changed the Act's wartime deter-
mination, it is necessary to explain the premise upon which WEFA
was propagated and ultimately passed. WEFA's proponents sought to
amend the Suspension Act because they believed that the Act, as
codified in 1948, only applied to formally declared wars.1 7 Conse-
quently, these proponents believed that prior to WEFA, the Act
would not have tolled the limitations period for fraudulent acts com-
mitted during the Iraq and Afghan conflicts simply because these con-
flicts were not formally declared wars.118 WEFA was proposed to
close this semantic "loophole."11 9 WEFA's proponents and oppo-
nents agreed upon this narrow reading of the phrase "at war. ' 120 The
difference among the legislators seemed to rest upon whether the ap-
plication of the Act should be expanded to include hostilities that
were not formally declared wars.121
Based on this premise, WEFA proposed a second category of con-
flict that would invoke the tolling provision of the Act.1 2 2 WEFA pro-
112. See id. Both the Defense Department and State Department "indicated that ongoing
hostilities in Iraq and Afghanistan have significantly hampered their ability to review contracts
and pursue investigation." Id.
113. See id.
114. See Press Release, U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy, Judiciary Committee Reports Leahy Bill
to Address Wartime Fraud 3 (June 26, 2008) (on file with author). Senator Leahy noted that the
bill would make the Act "applicable to the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan." 154
CONG. REC. S3175 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 2008) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
115. See S. REP. No. 110-431, at 4 (2008).
116. See id.
117. See Press Release, supra note 114, at 2.
118. See S. REP. No. 110-431, at 4.
119. Press Release, supra note 114, at 1. The committee report notes that the conflicts in Iraq
and Afghanistan are "likely exempt from [the Act] because they were undertaken by congres-
sional authorization of the use of military force, rather than by a formal declaration of war." S.
REP. No. 110-431, at 4.
120. See S. REP. No. 110-431, at 4, 7-8.
121. See id. at 7.
122. See id.
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posed that in addition to suspending the running of the limitations
period "[w]hen the United States is at war," as formally declared by
Congress, the period should be tolled when "Congress has enacted a
specific authorization for the use of the Armed Forces, as described in
section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution 123 (WPR). ' 124 WEFA ad-
ded the WPR category in both the substantive section of the Act and
its definitions section.1 25 The addition of this language in both clauses
ensured that the Act would apply to the current conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan.1 26 Thus, according to WEFA's legislative history and ex-
press language, the Act as amended is applicable in two types of mili-
tary action: formally declared wars and conflicts authorized pursuant
to the WPR.
The committee report clarified that the amended version of the Act
was not applicable to "peacekeeping missions under the auspices of
the United Nations or military actions not specifically authorized by
Congress pursuant to the War Powers Resolution. 1 2 7 According to
the report, suspending a limitations statute is permissible only under
"extraordinary circumstances."1 28 Only "significant military actions
requiring Congressional action ... trigger [the] suspension. 1 29
Senators Jeff Sessions and Tom Coburn conveyed their apprehen-
sions regarding WEFA in the committee report.1 30 They expressed a
concern that Congress was altering the Act in a manner that the en-
acting Congress never intended. 131 The Senators' argument rested on
the claim that the Suspension Act was only intended to apply to for-
mally declared wars, and that by adding a second category of conflict,
"conflicts that [fell] short of declared war" would invoke the Act's
provisions. 132 They noted that "[a] declared war is of a different na-
ture than an undeclared military conflict which can be a much smaller
affair that does not similarly affect the government's ability to build
and prosecute war fraud cases. 1 33
Proponents of the bill countered by noting that determining the
80th Congress's intention regarding whether the Act could apply to
123. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973).
124. S. REP. No. 110-431, at 9.
125. See id. at 5-6.
126. See id. at 4.
127. Id. at 5.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 7-8.




authorized military actions would be a dubious exercise because Con-
gress in 1948 could not have contemplated the WPR, which was
passed in 1973.134 Additionally, WEFA's proponents argued that not-
withstanding any possible limiting intention of the enacting Congress,
present-day Congress was not precluded "from doing the right thing
and extending the wartime suspension of statutes of limitation to war
zones created by authorizations for the use of military force. '135
B. The Presidential Proclamation: Formality Required
WEFA also changed the sunset provision of the Suspension Act.
As codified in 1948, the Act tolled the applicable limitations period
until three years after the "termination of hostilities, as proclaimed by
the President or a concurrent resolution of Congress. ' 136 This lan-
guage did not specify the form or manner in which the President
should "proclaim" the termination of hostilities. 137 At the end of
WWII, courts referred to President Truman's formal proclamation as
signifying the termination of hostilities. However, the text of the Act
did not expressly require a formal proclamation; it merely required
that the President proclaim that hostilities had ceased.1 38 WEFA clar-
ified this, requiring that the President issue a formal proclamation-
with notice to Congress-declaring the termination of hostilities. 139
When introducing WEFA, Senator Patrick Leahy noted that this re-
quirement would ensure that a "[s]ecret proclamation by the Presi-
dent or a self-serving 'mission accomplished' speech" would not
operate to end the tolling of the statute of limitations period.1 40
IV. "WAR Is AN EXISTING FACT, AND NOT A LEGISLATIVE
DECREE .... "141
WEFA ensured that the tolling provision of the Suspension Act
would apply to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. 142 However, the
question that this Comment posits is whether the changes that WEFA
imposed were necessary to achieve this result. This Part contends that
WEFA's amendments to the Suspension Act were not necessary and
134. See id. at 3 n.4.
135. Id.
136. 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (2006).
137. As discussed above, the WWII era cases did not present the issue of whether a formal
proclamation was required. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
138. See 18 U.S.C. § 3287.
139. See S. REP. No. 110-431, at 4 (2008).
140. 154 CONG. REC. S3175 (2008) (daily ed. Apr. 18, 2008) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
141. Dole v. Merchs. Mut. Marine Ins. Co., 51 Me. 465, 470 (1863).
142. See S. REP. No. 110-431, at 5 (2008).
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do not further the purpose that the Act was originally created to
serve. Section A argues that the Suspension Act, prior to WEFA, was
not as limited in application as WEFA's proponents and opponents
presumed; the Act prior to WEFA was indeed applicable to hostilities
other than formally declared wars.' 43 Based on the premise extrapo-
lated in Section A, Section B asserts that WEFA, although purporting
to expand the applicability of the Suspension Act, has actually se-
verely restricted it.144 Section C discusses the problems raised by
WEFA's approach to the wartime determination, namely, that WEFA
compromises the purposes of the Suspension Act for administrative
effeciency by substituting and essentially eliminating any real judicial
wartime determination for a per se categorical approach that is based
on political wartime acts and discourse. 145 Finally, Section D asserts
that courts would better serve the purposes of the Act by making the
wartime determination based on the circumstances of the conflict,
rather than the categorical approach suggested by WEFA's legislative
history.146
-A. "War Is No Less a War Because It Is Undeclared."47
One of the driving forces behind WEFA was the concern that the
Suspension Act, as codified in 1948, applied only to formally declared
wars, thereby excluding the "imperfect wars"1 48 in Iraq and Afghani-
stan from the Act's tolling provisions. 149 Certainly, this presumption
was not without justification. The Suspension Act was enacted during
a formally declared war, so one could presume it was intended for
formally declared wars. Additionally, when WEFA was introduced in
the Senate, Shelton had been the only civilian court to interpret the
"at war" provision of the Act 150 and had done so quite narrowly. 151
Nonetheless, strong counterarguments support a much broader read-
ing of the Act. This Section employs several of those arguments to
demonstrate that the Suspension Act, as codified in 1948, was applica-
ble to wars that were not formally declared.
143. See infra notes 147-202 and accompanying text.
144. See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
145. See infra notes 203-256 and accompanying text.
146. See infra notes 257-276 and accompanying text.
147. Morrison v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 78, 79 (M.D. Ga. 1970).
148. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 37, 40 (1800).
149. See 154 CONG. REC. S3174 (daily ed. April 18, 2008) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
150. WEFA was introduced in April 2008. See id. The Prosperi ruling came down in August
2008. See United States v. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d 436 (D. Mass. 2008).
151. See United States v. Shelton, 816 F. Supp. 1132, 1135 (W.D. Tex. 1993).
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1. The Act Never Required That War Be Formally Declared
As with any exercise in statutory interpretation, it is helpful to first
look at the text of the Act itself.152 Even though the Suspension Act
developed out of a formally declared war, its text does not contain any
language expressly requiring a formal declaration of war as a prereq-
uisite to be satisfied before the tolling provision comes into effect. 153
The 1942 and 1944 versions of the Suspension Act did not establish
any condition to be satisfied in order for the tolling provision to come
into effect. 15 4 Only when Congress sought to make the Act perma-
nent did it establish a precondition for the tolling provision. 55 How-
ever, the Act only required that "the United States [be] at war."'1 56
Noticeably absent from this language is the specification that the war
be formally declared. This exclusion is especially noteworthy when
considered in conjunction with the fact that Congress has expressly
included this specification in other wartime statutes. 57
Indeed, while an oft-used phrase, "at war" is not the only prerequi-
site employed by wartime statutes. Congress has specified that some
statutes only come into effect upon a formal declaration of war,158 in
time of a national emergency as declared by Congress, 159 or as de-
clared by the President.160 Congress has even amended wartime stat-
utes that initially used the phrase "at war" to more specifically require
that the war be formally declared. 161 Thus, there is a distinction-
recognized by Congress-between the phrases "at war" and "at war
as declared by Congress" as representative of two distinct phenom-
ena. This distinction indicates that the former does not automatically
152. "[Wlhere ... [a] statute's language is plain, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it
according to its terms." United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989).
153. 18 U.S.C. § 3287 (2006) stated-and still states-"[w]hen the United States is at war."
The statute contains no express requirement that the war be formally declared.
154. See Contract Settlement Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-395, § 19(b), ch. 358, 58 Stat. 649,
667 (1944); Act of Aug. 24, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-706, ch. 555, 56 Stat. 747 (1942).
155. See Act of June 25, 1948 Pub. L. No. 80-772, § 3287, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 683, 828 (1948).
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2416(d) (2006); 50 U.S.C. § 1811 (2006); 50 U.S.C. § 98f(a)(2)
(2006).
158. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2416(d) (2006); 50 U.S.C. § 98f(a)(2) (2006).
159. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1515 (2006).
160. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 2293 (2006).
161. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, 91 Pub. L. No. 510, § 142, 84 Stat. 1140, 1193
(1970) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 198) (amending 70 Pub. L. No. 601, § 132, 60 Stat. 812,
831 (1946)).
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implicate the latter.162 As two scholars have written in a report to
Congress,
In addition to the statutes that are explicitly triggered by a decla-
ration of war, a number come into the effect if a state of war, or
period of war, or simply "war" exists. Because a declaration of war
automatically creates a state of war, these authorities also are trig-
gered by the enactment of a declaration of war. But they can come
into effect even if no declaration of war is adopted.'63
The phrase "at war," as used in wartime statutes, is a term of art,
distinct from other wartime statute prerequisites. What exactly this
phrase connotes-that is, what constitutes a war-is beyond the scope
of this Comment, 164 but for now it is sufficient to say that the phrase
itself encompasses its own set of circumstances of which a formal dec-
laration of war need not be one.
2. A History Lesson: Being "At War" Never Required a Formal
Declaration
A formal declaration is not expressly required by the Act, and it
should not be implied from the circumstances surrounding the crea-
tion of the Act. Although the early to mid-twentieth century certainly
marked a time when the congressional act of formally declaring war
was a relatively prevalent practice,1 65 its prevalence does not necessi-
tate the conclusion that Congress presumed formal declarations were
and would be the established norm, such that the general phrase "at
war," without more, would nonetheless signify formally declared
war.1
6 6
162. "Had Congress intended the phrase 'at war' to serve as a limitation, it would have written
the modifier 'declared' into the Act as it has in other statutes." United States v. Prosperi, 573 F.
Supp. 2d 436, 446 (D. Mass. 2008).
163. JENNIFER K. ELSEA & RICHARD F. GRIMMET, CONG. RES. SERV., DECLARATIONS OF
WAR AND AUTHORIZATIONS FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 50 (Mar. 8, 2007) (emphasis added).
164. This question is further complicated by the fact that the Supreme Court has stated that
"Congress in drafting laws may decide that the nation may be 'at war' for one purpose, and 'at
peace' for another." Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228, 231 (1959).
165. In the early twentieth century, Congress issued eight formal declarations of war. ELSEA
& GRIMMET, supra note 163, at 3.
166. Indeed, formal declarations of war seemed to be the exception rather than the norm.
From 1700 to 1870 there were 107 cases of undeclared war, and not more than 10 declared wars.
Eagleton, supra note 15, at 20. Throughout history, the U.S. Congress has only issued 11 formal
declarations of war. ELSEA & GRIMMET, supra note 163, at 1. The United States Congress
formally declared war against Great Britain in 1812; Mexico in 1846; Spain in 1848; Germany
and Austria-Hungary in 1917; Japan, Germany, and Italy in 1941; and Bulgaria, Hungary, and
Rumania in 1942. See id. app. 1.
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Even during this era, two distinct categories of hostilities were rec-
ognized: the formally declared war and what this Comment will refer
to as the "circumstantial war." For the purposes of this argument, a
circumstantial war exists where the circumstances of a conflict create a
de facto war.167 A circumstantial war and a formally declared war are
not opposites. A formal declaration of war may or may not be one of
the circumstances that make up a circumstantial war. Thus, circum-
stantial war-the state of being "at war"-is a broad concept that can
(though it need not) include a formal declaration of war. 168
a. Judicial Recognition of the Circumstantial War
In Bas v. Tingy, nearly a century and a half before WWII, the Su-
preme Court recognized the disconnect-the United States could be
at war without Congress issuing a formal declaration of war.169 There,
the Court found that the United States was at war with France "in fact
and in law"'170 despite both governments' assertions to the contrary.171
Not only did Bas demonstrate the Court's position that war could ex-
ist without formal state recognition, it demonstrated that war could
exist despite state denials. The Court determined that the "legislative
will" of whether the country was or was not at war could manifest
itself in circumstances beyond a formal declaration.172 The reality that
"an American vessel fighting with a French vessel, to subdue and
make her prize, [was] fighting with an enemy" served as "sufficient
evidence of the legislative mind" that the two nations were at war.1 73
Bas demonstrates judicial recognition of the fact that a state of war
can exist without there being a formal declaration; that is, being "at
war" does not require a formal declaration of war. Formally declared
war and circumstantial war are not synonymous: hostilities can exist
167. Because the Supreme Court in Lee v. Madigan noted that the legislative purpose behind
wartime statutes affects whether a conflict is a war for the purposes of the particular statute, the
specific set of circumstances that amount to a circumstantial war will differ for each statute
depending on its particular purpose. See 358 U.S. 228, 231 (1959).
168. The difference between a circumstantial war and a formally declared war, and the fact
that each can exist independently of the other, can be explained using Grotius' differentiation
between war as a contest and war as a condition. Grotius was a sixteenth century scholar who
authored On the Law of War and Peace. As explained by one author, "[T]he contest of war is
not the only means for establishing the condition of war.... [Wlhen one employs [a declaration
of war], the condition of war (especially, its legal conditions) can thereby be established without
ever triggering the contest of war." HALLET, supra note 16, at 91.
169. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800).
170. Id. at 42.
171. See John Alan Cohan, Legal War: When Does It Exist, and When Does It End?, 27 HAS-
TINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 221, 260-61 (2004).
172. See Bas, 4 U.S. at 42.
173. Id.
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where the nation is at war as the circumstances dictate (circumstantial
war) and where the nation is at war pursuant to the dictates of politi-
cal discourse (formally declared war). 174
b. Scholarly Recognition of the Circumstantial War
Scholars too have recognized that being "at war" is a state that is
not dependent upon and is certainly not synonymous with a formally
declared war. 175 This concept has been recognized since before the
United States was founded. 176 Importantly, both declared and cir-
cumstantial wars were recognized as distinct categories during the
WWII era when the Suspension Act was created and codified. Profes-
sor Clyde Eagleton, writing on the eve of WWII, noted that "war
[could] exist without a formal declaration. ' 177 Additionally, Eagleton
noted that the international community acknowledged that the "legal
status of war may exist in the case of hostilities without a
declaration. '178
c. Executive and Legislative Recognition of Circumstantial War
Perhaps the strongest evidence of Congress's recognition that war
can exist without a formal declaration is the discourse surrounding the
passage of the declarations that "commenced" WWII. In requesting a
formal declaration of war against Japan, President Franklin Roosevelt
told Congress that a "state of war has existed between the United
States and the Japanese Empire" since the attack on Pearl Harbor. 179
Thus, according to Roosevelt, the United States was at war with Japan
before any formal declaration had been issued. As made obvious by
the purpose of his speech, this state of war did not exist because of any
formal designation, but rather, it arose from the surrounding
circumstances. 180
174. See The Brig Army Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863) ("A state of
actual war may exist without any formal declaration of it by either party.").
175. See, e.g., WILLIAM WHITING, WAR POWERS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 38-39 (10th ed. 1971) (1864); Eagleton, supra note 15, at 21; J. Terry Emerson, Making
War Without a Declaration, 17 J. LEGIs. 23, 29 (1990).
176. "After the end of the seventeenth century, with the growth of the new scientific spirit, it
was no longer considered respectable to permit the word war to represent simultaneously and
ambiguously both a condition and a contest." HALLET, supra note 16, at 62 (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 24 (Alexander Hamilton) (recognizing that "the
ceremony of a formal denunciation of war has of late fallen into disuse").
177. Eagleton, supra note 15, at 21.
178. Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
179. 87 CONG. REc. 9504-5 (1941) (statement of President Franklin Roosevelt).
180. "[Slince the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan ... a state of war has existed
.... " Id. at 9505.
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Congress conveyed the same notion in its declarations. The decla-
ration of war against Japan, for example, begins: "Declaring that a
state of war exists .... -181 This declaration recognized a war that was
ongoing, rather than a war that the declaration itself initiated. Thus,
Congress's own language evidences that war can exist without any for-
mal declaration.182 The other declarations issued during WWII con-
tain similar language. 183
From these facts two significant conclusions can be drawn. First,
the government and the legal community have recognized and con-
tinue to recognize that the country can be at war without a formal
declaration of war. Second, a circumstantial war (whether or not for-
mally declared) is a phenomenon that has legal consequences. Be-
cause there is a category of war that does not require any formal
declaration but that can affect legal change, it follows that a communi-
cative symbol is needed with which to label this phenomenon. The
phrase "at war" satisfies this aspect of our wartime discourse. 184
Congress has used the phrase "at war as declared by congress" to
signify that a statute is applicable only during declared war.185 There-
fore, to argue that the phrase "at war" also signifies declared war-
but not circumstantial war-is to give declared war two communica-
tive symbols but leave circumstantial war with none. To insist that the
phrase "at war" implies only formally declared war is to deny circum-
stantial war its seemingly natural designation. Thus, the phrase "at
war" should not be narrowly interpreted as signifying only declared
war.
181. Declaration of State of War with Japan, Pub. L. No. 77-238, ch. 561, 55 Stat. 795 (1941).
182. Congress has recognized the prior existence of a state of war in four out of the five wars
that have involved formal declarations. Cohan, supra note 171, at 243.
183. See Declaration of a Formal State 6f War with Germany, 55 Stat. 796 (Dec. 11, 1941);
Declaration of a Formal State of War with Italy, 55 Stat. 797 (Dec. 11, 1941); Declaration of a
Formal State of War with Bulgaria, 56 Stat. 307 (June 5, 1942); Declaration of a Formal State of
War with Hungary, 56 Stat. 307 (June 5, 1942); Declaration of a Formal State of War with Ruma-
nia, 56 Stat. 307 (June 5, 1942).
184. At the most basic level, the phrase "at war" is an appropriate means of signifying circum-
stantial war because to be engaged in a circumstantial war is to be at war. The phrase "at war"
also signifies circumstantial war better than others. Consider for example the phrases "un-
declared war," "war without formal declaration," or even "war as determined by the circum-
stances." The first two are not accurate because a circumstantial war can include a formal
declaration. Thus, as much as circumstantial war should not be made synonymous with a formal
declaration of war, it should not be synonymous with "undeclared war" either. The third option
says in six words what could be said in two.
185. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
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3. The Act's Legislative Purpose Supports a Broad Reading of "At
War"
A broad interpretation of the applicability of the Suspension Act
prior to WEFA is further supported by its legislative history and pur-
pose.1 86 The Act was created to "ensure that the fog of war [did] not
allow those who [might] defraud the United States from getting away
with it because their actions could not be investigated during hostili-
ties.' 18 7 The committee reports that accompanied the original version
of the Act were not concerned with nomenclature.18 8 Instead, they
focused on the size and demands of the war, as well as the effect of the
war procurement program on the Justice Department's resources and
how the procurement effort increased the government's exposure to
fraud.' 89 The political categorization of hostilities is not necessarily
indicative of a conflict's size or the strain it places on the govern-
ment's ability to perform essential functions.190 - These difficulties can
exist in conflicts other than formally declared wars.191 The legislative
purpose of the Act, as evidenced by its legislative history, indicates
that the Act was applicable to conflicts whose circumstances, not des-
ignation, mirrored those for which the Act was implemented.
4. Courts Have Applied the Act to Undeclared Wars
One final argument in favor of a broad reading of the phrase "at
war," as codified in the Suspension Act in 1948, is the broad applica-
tion given to the provision by courts. As discussed above, military
courts have interpreted the "at war" provision of the Act's military
counterpart more often than civilian courts have interpreted the Sus-
pension Act itself.192 They interpreted the "at war" provision broadly,
186. Additionally, WEFA's legislative history indicates that the Suspension Act may not be as
narrow as WEFA's proponents presumed. WEFA's committee report states that without WEFA
the Iraq and Afghan conflicts are "likely exempt" from the tolling provisions of the Act. S. REP.
No. 110-431, at 4 (2008). The uncertainty conveyed through the phrase "likely exempt" under-
mines the argument, which was presented at WEFA's introduction, that the Iraq and Afghan
conflicts are absolutely beyond the scope of the Suspension Act. See 154 CoNo. REC. S3174
(daily ed. Apr. 18, 2008) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
187. S. REP. No. 110-431, at 3 n.4 (2008).
188. See H.R. REP. No. 77-2051 (1942); S. REP. No. 77-1544 (1942).
189. See H.R. REP. No. 77-2051 (1942); S. REP. No. 77-1544 (1942).
190. See infra notes 251-257 and accompanying text.
191. The enormity of the Korean War "presented as frequent [an] opportunity for fraud as
would have existed had the conflict been designated a 'war' instead of a 'police action."' United
States v. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d 436, 443 (D. Mass. 2008) (quoting United States v. Taylor, 4
C.M.A. 232 (1954)).
192. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
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focusing on the "nature of the.., conflict," as opposed to the designa-
tion of the action. 193
Additionally, the most recent decision interpreting the provision-
Prosperi-rejected the notion that the Act, prior to WEFA, applied
only to formally declared wars. 194 The court ruled that limiting the
Act to situations where there is a formal declaration of war "incorpo-
rate[d] a condition precedent that is not found in [the Act's] text or
legislative history."'1 95
Moreover, although the Shelton court read the Act narrowly, its
logic is unpersuasive. The Shelton court noted that the Suspension
Act was created in response to problems that arose out of the "mas-
sive and pervasive" conflict of WWII. 196 The court indicated that the
Act had not been used during any of the conflicts since WWII, and it
assumed that the Act was not used because those conflicts were not
large enough in scale to warrant its application. 97 Based on this as-
sumption, the court stated that because the Persian Gulf conflict was
not as large as the previous wars-for which the Act, it assumed,
could not have been invoked-it too was insufficient to invoke the
Act. 198 This argument assumes too much by relying on evidence that
is not necessarily indicative of the Act's applicability. It assumes that
the Act was not employed during the war after WWII because it could
not have been (due to the "inadequate" 199 magnitude of the hostili-
ties).200 However, several other reasons can explain why the Act was
not invoked: perhaps the Justice Department did not need to invoke
its provisions, perhaps the attorneys who prosecuted wartime fraud
did not consider the option, or perhaps they consciously chose not to
employ the tolling provision.20
Given the Act's historical context, the government's recognition
that war can exist without a formal declaration, and the way the Act
193. See, e.g., United States v. Swain, 10 C.M.A. 37, 39 (1958) ("We need consider only
whether the conditions facing this country are such as to permit us to conclude that we are in a
state of war.").
194. See Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 446 ("[Tlhere is no compelling logic connecting a formal
declaration of war with the state of being at war.").
195. Id. at 445.




200. The Prosperi court read Shelton as relying on the concept of desuetude: because the Act
had "been invoked so infrequently ... it should be impliedly repealed." United States v. Pros-
peri, 573 F. Supp. 2d 436, 445. The Prosperi court rejected this argument. See id.
201. See id. ("The decision to assert the tolling provisions ... may reflect a political choice by
federal authorities, or may simply reflect the fact that the government in most cases is able to act
with sufficient alacrity to avoid the necessity of resorting to the Act's tolling provisions.").
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has been interpreted by the courts, the phrase "at war," as used in the
Suspension Act, should be read to apply to conflicts beyond formally
declared wars.
B. The Limitation of the Newest Version of the Suspension of
Limitations Act
If, as argued above, the Suspension Act prior to WEFA was not
limited to formally declared wars but was applicable to conflicts
whose circumstances constitute war for the purpose of the Act, there
was no need to expand the Act's "at war" clause. But that is exactly
what WEFA purported to do-add a second category of conflict to
which the Act would apply. However, if courts find the 110th Con-
gress's interpretation of the phrase "at war" persuasive and thus fol-
low it, the Act will apply in only two situations: situations of formally
declared war and situations where Congress has authorized the use of
military force pursuant to the WPR. 20 2 Therefore, the expansion that
WEFA purported to provide potentially serves as a limitation.
C. Abandoning Legislative Purpose for Judicial Efficiency
If the legislative purpose behind WEFA and its accompanying as-
sumptions about the Suspension Act prevail, then the Act as amended
is applicable in only two instances. However, these two instances are
not defined by a set of circumstances regarding the hostilities. Rather,
they are categories.20 3 The use of a categorical approach to determine
when the Act is in effect essentially eliminates any judicial wartime
determination. 20 4
The committee report accompanying WEFA applauds the categori-
cal approach for "provid[ing] a clear point in time at which the statute
of limitations will begin to run, providing certainty to courts, prosecu-
tors and litigants. °20 5 In light of courts' longstanding position of "re-
pose" regarding statutes of limitations,20 6 it is logical and certainly
efficient to provide a specific date (the date on which war is formally
declared or the authorization for the use of force enacted) to deter-
mine when the Act would come into effect.
202. See S. REP. No. 110-431, at 5 (2008).
203. See id.
204. This is assuming, as was argued above, that the Act was originally intended to apply to
any conflicts whose circumstances amount to a war for the purposes of the Act.
205. S. REP. No. 110-431, at 4.
206. Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114-15 (1970). The Supreme Court has stated
that the Suspension Act "creates an exception to [the] long-standing congressional policy of
repose." Bridges v. United States 346 U.S. 209, 215 (1953) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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This Section, however, will argue against the use of the categorical
approach and in favor of a circumstantially based judicial determina-
tion.207 As the Prosperi court stated, the purpose of the Act was to
"capture any authorized military engagement that might compromise
or impede the government's ability to investigate allegations of
fraud. ' 208 Thus, in looking to best serve the purpose of the Act,
courts should look to the circumstances of the conflict, rather than its
formal designation.
This Section does not deny that a categorical approach provides
some benefits: certainty and efficiency. 20 9 This Section seeks only to
raise the question of whether this certainty and efficiency outweigh
the risks inherent in a mechanical approach that is dependent upon
political discourse and action. It highlights several of the risks of using
the categorical approach that the 110th Congress assumes courts will
use in interpreting the Act, demonstrating the need for courts to make
this determination in an organic, non-mechanical way.
1. Pacificus and Helvidius: The Ongoing Political Struggle for War
Power210
One risk in using a categorical approach lies in the innate qualities
of the categories themselves: both are creatures of politics. Each cate-
gory is a political power that can be wielded, withheld, and used in
compromise. It is the political context out of which both of these cate-
gories were created that makes these potential abuses even more real;
both the power to declare war and the power to authorize the Execu-
tive's use of military force were a result of the political struggle for
war power that has been waged between the two political branches
since the creation of the Constitution.2 11
207. See infra notes 210-276 and accompanying text.
208. United States v. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d 436, 449 (D. Mass. 2008) (emphasis added).
209. It provides courts and litigants certainty in knowing if and when the Act's tolling provi-
sion has been invoked. The ability for litigants and courts to point to a specific date of a formal
declaration of war, or a WPR authorization, does promote judicial efficiency.
210. In the late eighteenth century, Alexander Hamilton, under the pen name Pacificus, and
James Madison, under the pen name Helvidius, debated which branch of government-the
Executive or the Legislative-should have the power to engage the country in war. See HALLET,
supra note 16, at 30. Helvidius argued on behalf of the Legislative Branch, stating that "[t]hose
who are to conduct a war cannot . . .be proper or safe judges of whether a war ought to be
commenced, continued or concluded." Id. Pacificus argued that the congressional power to
declare war was merely an exception to "the general 'Executive Power' vested in the President
[that should] be construed strictly ... extended no further than is essential to [its] execution."
Id. at 30-31.
211. The U.S. Constitution is "an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American
foreign policy." ROGER DAVIDSON & WALTER OLESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS 452
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The allocation of the power to declare war exemplifies this struggle.
Some constitutional framers initially proposed that Congress should
have the power to "make war. ' 21 2 However, this language did not
find its way into Article 1.213 Rather than the authority to make war,
Congress was provided the authority to "declare war. '214 Proponents
of this language wanted to ensure that the Executive maintained the
ability to wage war,215 believing that "the direction of war most pecu-
liarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power
by a single hand. '2 16 Opponents of this language took the alternative
position that "[i]f the President alone is allowed to send anywhere
abroad, at any time, hundreds of thousands of American troops with-
out a declaration of war ... then, indeed there is little left of Ameri-
can constitutional government. '217 History has shown that the
Executive does not necessarily share this sentiment.218 Out of the
more than 150 times American forces have engaged in combat over-
seas, only five wars-the War of 1812, the Spanish-American war, the
Mexican-American war, WWI, and WWII-have involved formal
declarations. 219
The political tug of war that has resulted has involved both
branches grappling for more power, often in response to the power
exercised by the other. Aurthur Schlesinger, in his landmark work
The Imperial Presidency, described the "postwar congressional im-
pulse to strike back at the war-magnified Presidency" 220 and the
"grand revival of the presidential prerogative ... as a direct reaction
to . . . [Congress's efforts] to seize the guiding reins of foreign
policy., 221
The WPR was also created out of this political tug of war. Tensions
came to a head after the Executive flexed its war power muscles dur-
(10th ed. 2006) (quoting EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS,
1787-1957, at 171 (1957)).
212. Emerson, supra note 175, at 30.
213. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
214. Id.
215. They believed "that the president must have the power to repel sudden attacks without a
prior declaration of war." Sidak, supra note 15, at 35.
216. THE FEDERALIST No. 74 (Alexander Hamilton).
217. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 136 (1973).
218. "Korea beguiled the American government.., into an unprecedented claim for inherent
presidential power .... The circumstances of the [Korean War], an executive document sourly
said in 1951, make any debate over prerogatives and power essentially sterile if not dangerous to
the success of our foreign policy." Id. at 135 (internal quotation marks omitted).
219. Gregory M. Huckabee, The War Powers Resolution: Law or Political Rhetoric?, 34 A.F.
L. REv. 207, 209 (1991).
220. SCHLESINGER, supra note 217, at 127.
221. Id. at 99.
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ing the Korean and Vietnam wars, and in 1973, Congress, acting on its
"postwar congressional impulse to strike back," enacted the WPR.222
Passed over the veto of President Nixon,223 the WPR was the congres-
sional effort to reverse the "devastating precedent [Congress] ha[d]
set in remaining silent while the President took over the powers spe-
cifically reserved for Congress in the Constitution. '2
24
The WPR never received a warm welcome from the Executive
Branch. Opponents viewed it as Congress's effort to "correct nearly
two hundred years [of what it perceived as] error, strip the Presidency
of many of its most essential powers, and restore what [members of
Congress] fondly imagine was the constitutional model of 1789."225
Since its passage, presidents have considered the measure unconstitu-
tional,226 have sought to operate outside of its provisions,2 27 and have
stated that a congressional authorization is unnecessary even when
they do operate under it.228 One of President George W. Bush's state-
ments is demonstrative of the executive reaction toward the WPR.
When signing the Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against
Iraq Resolution 2002, President Bush noted that he only sought a
"resolution of support" from Congress and that signing the authoriza-
tion did not "change ... the long-standing positions of the executive
branch on ... the President's constitutional authority to use [military]
force."229
Considering the struggle for war power in the past, the risk in using
the categorical approach is that the congressional choice to employ
(or withhold) either of these designations may be more reflective of
political relations rather than the conflict itself. The language of the
WPR makes it acutely susceptible to this possibility. The WPR im-
poses a sixty-day limit on the President if he does not obtain congres-
sional authorization.230 The sixty-day limit is only triggered when
forces are introduced into hostile or imminently hostile situations.231
222. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973).
223. Richard F. Grimmet, The War Powers Resolution After Thirty Years, in THE WAR POW-
ERS RESOLUTION AFTER 30 YEARS 1, 2 (Gerald M. Perkins ed., 2005).
224. SCHLESINGER, supra note 217, at 135 (quoting Rep. Frederic R. Coudert, Jr.).
225. HALLETr[, supra note 16, at 39.
226. See Grimmet, supra note 223, at 10.
227. See id. at 47 (discussing President Bill Clinton's failure to withdraw troops from Kosovo
after sixty days even though no authorization had been given).
228. The President has "welcomed support from the Congress in the form of legislation au-
thorizing him to use U.S. military forces,... but has not taken the view that he is required to
obtain such authorization." ELSEA & GRIMMET, supra note 163, at 6 (emphasis added).
229. Grimmet, supra note 223, at 57.
230. Pub. L. No. 93-148, § 5(a).
231. See Huckabee, supra note 219, at 215.
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The determination of whether troops are being introduced into hostile
situations is based on a report that the WPR mandates the President
to submit.2 32 The President may not wish to start the running of the
sixty-day period, and in order to avoid it, he may choose not to submit
the necessary "hostilities" report to Congress,233 he may delay in sub-
mitting it,234 or he may be intentionally obscure as to whether the re-
port is in fact a hostilities report.235 In these scenarios, the President
does not require and Congress need not provide authorization for the
use of force. In some cases, the President has continued the mobiliza-
tion of troops in hostilities beyond the sixty days without congres-
sional approval.236 In these instances, when the President exercises
the war powers that he feels are rightly his, but that are beyond the
confines of the WPR, the Suspension Act would not apply, although
the circumstances might dictate that it should.
2. Each Category Brings With It a Whole Host of Political
Consequences.
Another risk in using these categories is the fact that each invokes
legal and political consequences that Congress may be hesitant to
bring into play. Thus, the decision to label a conflict with certain war-
time discourse may be based more on congressional willingness to in-
voke a particular category's secondary consequences and less upon
the nature of the conflict. Speaker Thomas Foley explained why Con-
gress did not formally declare war during the Persian Gulf Conflict:
[T]he reason [that Congress] did not declare a formal war was not
because there is any difference . .. in the action that was taken and
in a formal declaration of war with respect to military operations,
but because there is some question about whether we wish to excite
or enact some of the domestic consequences of a formal declaration
of war-seizure of property, censorship, and so forth which the
President neither sought nor desired.237
232. See HALLET, supra note 16, at 5.
233. "Congress is powerless to act unless and until the [President] acts first .... Should the
[President] ... refuse to report ... Congress is left high and dry, sputtering and protesting but
unable to do much else." Id. at 5-6.
234. See Grimmet, supra note 223, at 28-30 (describing how over the course of six months
President George H.W. Bush deployed hundreds of thousands of troops to Kuwait but sent two
reports to Congress that stated that hostilities were not imminent).
235. "[W]hen Reagan reported ... that he had deployed 1,200 marines to Lebanon... he left
it up to Congress to decide whether his letter constituted a hostilities report." HALLEYr, supra
note 16, at 6.
236. See Gerald G. Howard, Comment, Combat in Kosovo: Ignoring the War Powers Resolu-
tion, 38 Hous. L. Rev. 261, 281 (2001).
237. Grimmet, supra note 223, at 32.
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In addition to domestic political consequences, formal declarations
of war and authorizations for the use of force under the WPR also
have international political consequences. The international ramifica-
tions of upholding alliances certainly affect congressional action.
Consider, for example, the United States' declarations of war against
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania during WWII. These nations de-
clared war on the United States in late 1941.238 However, the United
States government generally ignored those declarations. 239 It was
"[o]nly later, as a gesture of friendship to the Soviet Union" that Presi-
dent Roosevelt asked Congress to recognize the wars with these coun-
tries.2 40 Thus, the declarations were not necessarily reflective of the
nature of the conflict. They were an effort by the government to ap-
pease its allies.
Additionally, there are "numerous . . .diplomatic reasons why
states wish to avoid the disruption and embarrassment of admitting a
state of war exists. ' 241 Some of these include the belief that the inter-
national community has outlawed war as a means of resolving inter-
state dispute and the desire not to interrupt treaty agreements or
trade. 242 Thus, the international implications of formally declaring
war in particular may be more indicative of why Congress chooses to
employ certain wartime discourse than the conflict itself.
4. Do the Dates Match Up?
One of the purposes for employing the categorical approach is to
provide both courts and litigators certainty in knowing the dates upon
which the tolling provisions of the Act take effect.243 While this ap-
proach may provide clear dates, it does not necessarily provide accu-
rate dates.
Consider potential problems for determining the cessation of hostil-
ities in accordance with WEFA. The Suspension Act as amended by
WEFA requires courts to look to a formal proclamation of the Presi-
dent or a concurrent resolution of Congress to determine when hostil-
ities have ceased. 244 Thus, rather than look to see whether hostilities
have actually ended, courts must look to whether one of the political
238. See Cohan, supra note 171, at 242.
239. See id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 227.
242. Id.
243. See S. REP. No. 110-431, at 5 (2008).
244. See Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L.
No. 110-417, § 855, 122 Stat. 4356, 4545 (2008).
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branches has communicated-in a very specific manner-that hostili-
ties have ceased.
Even though WEFA requires that the presidential proclamation be
a formal proclamation in order to ensure that courts not look to "self-
serving" presidential speeches,2 45 there is no way to guarantee that
even formal proclamations would be free of political motivation or
would better reflect when hostilities end. Consider the cases following
WWII where President Truman issued a formal proclamation regard-
ing the cessation of hostilities.246 Even then, questions arose as to
whether the date of the proclamation was appropriate for the pur-
poses of the Suspension Act. In United States v. Smith,247 the concur-
rence took issue with the fact that the proclamation was made on
December 31, 1946, even though "all war procurement stopped [and]
contracts were canceled" "immediately after V-J day," which was Sep-
tember 2, 1945-sixteen months earlier.248
The requirement that courts look to the political branches to see
whether either has manifested the belief that hostilities have ended
requires courts to forgo interpreting the facts of the situation and in-
stead interpret the actions and words of Congress or the President.
The risk here lies not only in the fact that these formal discursive cate-
gories and modes of communication (formal declarations of war, au-
thorizations for the use of military force, formal presidential
proclamations, and congressional resolutions) can be politically influ-
enced, but also in the fact that they can produce inaccurate dates.
Thus, while we can say that the dates upon which the Act relies may
be clear,249 they are not necessarily accurate.
5. "Sometime They'll Give a War and Nobody Will Come."250
Taking a categorical approach rather than basing the wartime deter-
mination on the "indicia of war '2 51 is problematic because each cate-
gory does not necessarily reflect the magnitude of the hostilities that it
245. See 154 CONG. REC. S3175 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 2008) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
246. Proclamation No. 2714, 12 Fed. Reg. 1 (Jan. 1, 1947). It is interesting to note the procla-
mation itself claimed that "a state of war still exist[ed]." Id. Nonetheless, President Truman felt
it was "possible to declare and ... in the public interest to declare, that hostilities [had] termi-
nated." Id.
247. United States v. Smith, 342 U.S. 225 (1952).
248. Id. at 230 (Clark, J., concurring).
249. These dates may not be so clear. Consider what might happen if both the President and
Congress have proclaimed hostilities to be over but at different times, or if neither a formal
proclamation is issued nor a resolution passed, even though hostilities have in fact ended..
250. CARL SANDBURG, THE PEOPLE, YES 43 (1936).
251. United States v. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d 436, 446 (D. Mass. 2008).
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labels.252 The purpose of the Suspension Act was to provide the gov-
ernment more time to investigate the fraud that grew out. of the "gi-
gantic war program" that developed when the number of government
contracts increased while government resources were stretched.2 53
Neither a formal declaration nor an authorization for the use of mili-
tary force pursuant to the WPR is a label that depends upon or is even
related to any of these factors.
Consider the Korean War, which was officially deemed a "police
action. '254 During the war, there was neither a formal declaration nor
any authorization by Congress to use force.255 Thus, under WEFA's
proponents' proposed interpretation of the Act, the Korean War
would be excluded from the Act's tolling provision. This exclusion
acutely demonstrates the arbitrariness of the categorical approach,
particularly in light of the fact that after adjusting for inflation, the
Korean War cost $160 billion more than WWI, which, as a formally
declared war, would toll the statute of limitations pursuant to the
Act.
2 5 6
Considering the risks outlined above, the categorical approach to
making the wartime determination has the potential to frustrate the
effective application of the Act. While WEFA may provide certainty,
it has potentially compromised accuracy. While it may provide effi-
ciency, it has potentially compromised the purposes of the Act.
252. As Karl Llewellyn has noted,
[Clategories ... once formulated and once they have entered into thought processes,
tend to take on an appearance of solidity, reality and inherent value which has no
foundation in experience. More than this: although originally formulated on the model
of at least some observed data, they tend, once they have entered into the organization
of thinking, both to suggest the presence of corresponding data when these data are not
in fact present, and to twist any fresh observation of data into conformity with the
terms of the categories.
Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL
THEORY 22, 33 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2003).
253. See H.R. REP. No. 77-2051, at 2 (1942).
254. United States v. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d 436, 447 (D. Mass. 2008).
255. President Truman did not even seek congressional authorization before sending troops to
Korea. See Louis Fisher, The Korean War: On What Legal Basis Did Truman Act?, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 21, 33 (1995). Although the WPR had not yet been enacted, congressional authoriza-
tion for the use of force was a practice dating as far back as 1798. See ELSEA & GRIMMET, supra
note 163, at 7. Moreover, according to WEFA's legislative history, police actions are insufficient
to invoke the tolling provision of the Act. See S. REP. No. 110-431, at 4 (2008).
256. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 452 n.28.
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D. Courts Should Not Be Required to Close Their Eyes to the
Circumstances of a Conflict
A wartime determination that requires courts to look at the circum-
stances and consequences of a conflict would better serve the Act's
purpose. The Act was intended to provide the government sufficient
time to investigate fraud that occurs during war when the amount of
government spending increases and when there are heavier than nor-
mal burdens on investigative resources. 257 Finding whether these con-
ditions exist requires a thoughtful determination. This determination
should not be made to rely upon Congress's use of or failure to use a
formal declaration of war or a WPR authorization. These categories
have no necessary relation to the existence of the above mentioned
circumstances. Their use in this instance can be wholly arbitrary.
Requiring courts to take their cue from formal, political acts of the
Executive and Legislature in determining when hostilities have begun
or ended assumes that the political branches' actions will accurately
reflect the state of hostilities. However, as indicated by the courts in
Prosperi and Smith, this expectation is often frustrated. It is here that
Prosperi should be defended, particularly in regard to its decision that
the war in Iraq ended on May 1, 2003 when President Bush gave his
"Mission Accomplished" speech,258 despite the fact that billions of
dollars were still being spent on the Iraq war when the decision came
down in 2008.259 While the court's determination may seem to have
abandoned common sense, there is no denying it complied fully with
the provisions of the Act. Prosperi looked to the President and Con-
gress to determine whether either had conveyed any indication that
hostilities had ended.260 President Bush's speech stating that the "ty-
rant has fallen, and Iraq is free" certainly indicated hostilities had en-
ded and "the [government] transition ... to democracy" had taken
over.261 Prosperi's determination seems odd at best, but it should not
257. See H.R. REP. No. 77-2051, at 2; S. REP. No. 77-1544, at 2 (1942).
258. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 455.
259. "The enacted total for Iraq in [fiscal year] 2008 is some $141 billion." AMy BELASCO,
CONG. RES. SERVS., THE COST OF IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, & OTHER GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR
OPERAIONS SINCE 9/11, at 15 (Sept. 28, 2008), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/
RL33110.pdf.
260. See Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 454-55.
261. President George W. Bush, Remarks from the USS Abraham Lincoln Announcing Ma-
jor Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended (May 1, 2003), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.
archives.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030501-15.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2010). It is interesting
to note that in late 2008, President Bush admitted regret in having made the speech. See Alexan-
der Mooney, Bush: "I Regret Saying Some Things I Should Not Have Said," CNN, Nov. 11, 2008,




be viewed as a reflection of the court's analytical abilities. This out-
come is the result of prohibiting courts from looking to the circum-
stances of a conflict.
To obtain an accurate reflection of the state of hostilities, the body
responsible for the wartime determination should be able to look to
the conflict rather than another branch's interpretation of or reaction
to the conflict. Accordingly, courts should have the authority to de-
cide not only whether circumstances dictate that the United States is
"at war," but also to determine whether hostilities have ended.
The wartime determination is an assessment that is not foreign to
courts. 262 The determination is not a standardless one. In the context
of the Suspension Act, the Prosperi court laid out four factors for
courts to consider in making the wartime determination.2 63 These fac-
tors take into consideration the purpose of the Act,264 the fact that
war is a dynamic phenomenon,265 and the fact that it is the prerogative
of the political branches to determine whether the nation is at war. 266
The first factor (requiring courts to look to "the extent of the au-
thorization given by Congress to the President to act") 267 and the
third factor (requiring courts to look to how much Congress has in-
vested in a conflict) 268 take into consideration the actions of the politi-
cal branches, such that courts are not making the wartime
determination wholly apart from the Executive and Legislative bod-
ies. These factors should assuage fears that a circumstantially based
wartime determination would enable the Judicial Branch to usurp any
war powers or even enter the war powers struggle. "[W]hether ...
war, in its legal sense exists, is to be determined alone by the political
power of the government. 2 69 However, as demonstrated in Bas v.
Tingy, courts should not be limited in what they may look to in dis-
cerning the legislative will.270 The political branches may engage in
acts of war without calling the resulting conflict a war. Accordingly,
courts should be permitted to look to different acts of the political
262. See, e.g., Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 42 (1800); Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d
1328, 1335 (9th Cir. 1992); Bush v. Dellums, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1146 (D.D.C. 1990).
263. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 449.
264. See id. Factors three and four take into consideration the conflict's procurement effort
and diversion of government resources. See id.
265. See id. Factor two looks to how war is defined "under accepted definitions of the term."
Id. The Prosperi court examined how the term "war" is used in contemporary context. Id. at
451.
266. Id. at 449. Factors one and three look to the actions of the political branches. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Sutton v. Tiller, 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 593, 595 (1869).
270. See Bas v. T'ngy, 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 37, 42 (1800).
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bodies to determine whether there is war. In doing so, courts will de-
fer to the political branches' implied and express indications that the
country is at war.
The second Prosperi factor (determining whether the "conflict is
deemed a 'war' under accepted definitions of the term and the rules of
international law") takes into consideration the amorphous nature of
war.271 By looking to modern and accepted definitions of war, Pros-
peri's circumstantially based approach would accommodate the
changes that occur in international and domestic discourse.2 72 A cate-
gorical approach, on the other hand, does not necessarily account for
changes, but instead is likely to need changing itself as new ways of
categorizing conflict develop and others fall into disuse. WEFA dem-
onstrates this. If one takes a categorical approach-as did WEFA's
proponents-in order for the Act to remain viable, new categories of
war will have to be added to the Act as wartime discourse changes. A
circumstantial approach does not require that the Act be further
amended in order to keep up with how the nation classifies war.
The third factor (looking to the "the cost of the reacted procure-
ment effort") 273 and the fourth factor (looking to the "diversion of
resources" caused by the conflict) 274 take into account the purpose of
the Act. 275 By determining whether the circumstances that the Act
was created to remedy do in fact exist, courts can accurately apply the
Act in accordance with its purpose. Moreover, these factors ensure
that minor conflicts, which WEFA's proponents wanted to prevent
from invoking the tolling provision of the Act, will not come within
the Act's purview.
The Prosperi court did not indicate that these factors were exclu-
sive.276 These factors may develop into standards that provide the
predictability and certainty to courts and litigators that WEFA's pro-
ponents desired, while comporting with the purposes of the Act.
V. How WILL COURTS MAKE THE WARTIME DETERMINATION
AFrER WEFA?
The question that remains to be answered is how the Act as
amended by WEFA will be applied by courts. WEFA's proponents
271. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 449.
272. See id. at 451.
273. Id. at 449.
274. Id.
275. See S. REP. No. 110-431, at 3 n.4 (2008).
276. The Prosperi court stated that courts should "include" these factors. Prosperi, 573 F.
Supp. 2d at 449.
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took the view that the Act's wartime determination would involve a
per se categorical approach. However, this may not necessarily have
to be the case. It will depend on competing principles of statutory
interpretation.
Courts could engage in a strict textualist reading of the Act. A
strict textualist reading would emphasize that the Act prior to WEFA,
and still today, does not specifically require war to be formally de-
clared. Although WEFA was intended to clarify the wartime determi-
nation, Congress left the phrase "at war" untouched. 277 And although
Congress assumed the phrase "at war" referred only to formally de-
clared wars, it did not amend the Act to expressly convey this notion,
even though it could have done so, and even though similar amend-
ments have been passed previously by Congress. 278 Courts may look
at this omission as intentional; even though Congress felt that the Act
only applied to formally declared wars, it did not want to limit courts'
abilities to make the wartime determination by expressly stating it.
Moreover, the premise upon which WEFA was enacted, as argued
above, was incorrect. The fact that Congress adopted an amendment
on the basis of a misconception as to the meaning of the law does not
turn that misconception into law. 279 Employing this reasoning, courts
could determine that WEFA only creates one per se category-con-
flicts that have been authorized pursuant to the WPR-while still al-
lowing any other conflicts, whose circumstances amount to a war for
the purposes of the Act, to toll the limitations period.
However, courts may opt to take the categorical approach if they
apply the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterious to their
reading of the text. Using this principle, courts could determine that
because Congress had to add a second category of conflict that would
invoke the tolling provision of the Act, that second category was not
originally intended to be covered by the Act. Thus, implying that be-
cause the phrase "at war" did not encompass authorized uses of mili-
tary force, it does not encompass other types of conflicts that are not
designated wars by formal declaration. Courts may find that Congress
added this one category of conflict to the exclusion of all that are not
expressly included in the Act.
WEFA's legislative history also seems to permit courts to take ei-
ther the categorical approach or circumstantial approach when mak-
ing the Act's wartime determination. For the most part, WEFA's
277. See id.
278. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
279. See United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960) ("[T]he views of a subsequent Con-
gress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.").
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legislative history conveys that the phrase "at war" refers only to de-
clared wars. The committee report accompanying WEFA states with
certainty that WEFA was necessary to ensure that the Act would ap-
ply both "when the United States is engaged in a declared war" and
when Congress has authorized the use of force.280 Furthermore, the
statements surrounding WEFA in the Congressional Record advocate
the notion that the Act prior to WEFA only applied to formally de-
clared wars.2 81 However, this notion was not entirely without doubt.
The committee report also states that the conflicts in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan were "likely" exempt from the Act as enacted in 1948, indi-
cating that perhaps the phrase "at war" did not refer solely to
declared wars.282 This uncertainty invites courts to determine which
approach they will take when making the wartime determination for
the Act in the future.
Courts may still follow the categorical tack and apply the Act only
in limited circumstances. However, courts would not be unjustified in
interpreting the phrase "at war" by using the Prosperi factors, thereby
applying the tolling provision based on a conflict's circumstances
rather than its official designation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Wartime fraud that is committed against the government is a grow-
ing problem. The United States is using private contractors in war
more and more.28 3 Beyond that, the current financial crisis has moved
the government to buy shares in banks and other financial institu-
tions,2 4 leaving the government susceptible to even more fraudulent
conduct during the ongoing war on terror. The financial and political
climates have forced this once overlooked law into the forefront of the
government's possible litigation strategies. 2 5 However, as discussed
above, this most recent attempt to revive the Act may not have been
absolutely necessary and may in fact prevent the Act from applying
when it is needed most. The categories potentially created by WEFA
do not necessarily reflect the purpose behind the Suspension Act and
280. See S. REP. No. 110-434, at 2.
281. See 154 CONG. REC. S3175 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 2008) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
282. S. REP. No. 110-431, at 4.
283. Id. at 3.
284. Jim Puzzanghera & E. Scott Reckard, U.S. Ties New Strings to Bank Aid, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 24, 2009, at B2, C4.
285. See Judge Rules Wartime Law Applies to Big Dig, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Sept. 3, 2008,
http://www.upi.com/Top-News/2008/09/03/Judge-rules-warfime-law-applies-to-Big-DigIUPI-




prevent courts from engaging in any substantial wartime
determination.
In order to ensure that the Act applies in accordance with its pur-
pose, courts should not limit themselves to taking a categorical ap-
proach. They should follow Prosperi and look to the circumstances of
the conflict: the size of the war procurement program, how stretched
the government's resources are, and whether the conflict amounts to
war in accordance with contemporary standards. It is only through
this approach that the Act will serve its true legislative purpose of
ensuring that "the crisis of war [is] not ... used as a means of avoiding
just penalties for wrongdoing. '286
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